Audit conducted at v1.5.2 (commit 688938d). Findings:
- 0 Critical / 0 High / 0 Medium / 2 Low / 1 Info
- Realistic attack surface = host transport + OTA RX; both traced
end-to-end with no exploitable defects found.
Hardening applied as part of audit follow-up:
- esp-println now uses default-features=false; output target is
selected per-board. UART-host boards (heltec_v3_uart,
elecrow_thinknode_m2, lilygo_tbeam classic) get `no-op` so
defmt/panic output cannot corrupt frames on UART0 (the host
protocol wire). Native-USB boards keep `auto` so espflash-monitor
still works.
- README documents the trust model: no host-transport auth, no
RF-regulatory enforcement, MAC exposed via USB iSerialNumber +
GET_INFO.mcu_uid (intentional, needed by donglora-mux for
multi-dongle disambiguation).
