Add comprehensive spec audit results and pyMC_core issue reports

- CHANGELOG.md: Full audit findings organized by severity
- PYMC_CORE_ISSUES.md: 7 evidence-based bug reports for pyMC_core
  (wrong constants, broken path_len decoding, wrong TRACE hash,
  wrong SNR calculation)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

Add comprehensive spec audit results and pyMC_core issue reports

- CHANGELOG.md: Full audit findings organized by severity
- PYMC_CORE_ISSUES.md: 7 evidence-based bug reports for pyMC_core
  (wrong constants, broken path_len decoding, wrong TRACE hash,
  wrong SNR calculation)
- Remove ERRATA.md: contents already covered by audit findings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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# MeshCore Protocol Specification
## Section 7: Payload — Anonymous Request
### Overview
The anonymous request payload allows a node to send an encrypted message to a
recipient without the recipient needing to know the sender in advance. Instead of
a 1-byte source hash, the full 32-byte Ed25519 public key of the sender is
included, enabling the recipient to compute the shared secret for decryption.
### Payload Type
Header payload type field: `0x07` (ANON_REQ)
### Wire Format
```
0
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| dest_hash(1) | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Sender Public Key (32 bytes) |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cipher MAC (2 bytes) | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Ciphertext (N × 16 bytes, N ≥ 1) |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```
### Fields
| Field | Offset | Size | Type | Description |
|-------|--------|------|------|-------------|
| dest_hash | 0 | 1 byte | raw | First byte of recipient's Ed25519 public key |
| sender_pub_key | 1 | 32 bytes | raw | Full Ed25519 public key of sender |
| cipher_mac | 33 | 2 bytes | raw | Truncated HMAC-SHA256 over ciphertext |
| ciphertext | 35 | variable (multiple of 16) | raw | AES-128-ECB encrypted data |
### Minimum Size
- Minimum payload: 1 + 32 + 2 + 16 = 51 bytes
### Encryption
1. Sender computes ECDH shared secret using its private key and the recipient's
public key.
2. Encrypt plaintext using AES-128-ECB with first 16 bytes of shared secret.
3. Compute HMAC-SHA256 over ciphertext with full 32-byte shared secret.
Truncate to 2 bytes.
4. Assemble: dest_hash || sender_pub_key || MAC || ciphertext.
### Decryption
1. Read dest_hash. If it does not match this node, the packet is not for us
(but MAY be forwarded).
2. Read 32-byte sender_pub_key. Construct an Identity from it.
3. Compute ECDH shared secret between this node's private key and sender's
public key.
4. Verify the MAC and decrypt as in [Section 14](14-crypto.md).
### Cross-References
- [Section 6: Encrypted Payloads](06-payload-encrypted.md) — Standard encrypted format
- [Section 14: Cryptography](14-crypto.md) — Encrypt-then-MAC
- [Section 15: Identity](15-identity.md) — ECDH key exchange
- Test vectors: `corpus/payloads/anon-req/`
### Reference Implementation
- `Mesh::createAnonDatagram()` in `src/Mesh.cpp` — Encoding
- `Mesh::onRecvPacket()`, case `PAYLOAD_TYPE_ANON_REQ` — Decoding