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meshcore-spec/versions/v0.1.0/08-payload-group.md
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swaitsandClaude Opus 4.7 9232c16f7c
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feat(versioning): snapshot corpus per spec version
A frozen spec is only meaningful if it's paired with the corpus
that was current at release time — otherwise a v0.1.0 reader
follows "see corpus/payloads/ack/" and lands on a file whose
test vectors may have changed since v0.1.0 was cut.

Three changes:

1. `cut-version` now copies BOTH src/ AND corpus/ into the
   snapshot directory. A release is the pair, not just the text.

2. The corpus URL rewriting in cut-version now retargets
   /tree/main/corpus -> /tree/main/versions/<v>/corpus (and the
   blob variant). This lets the link resolve on GitHub from main
   alone — no git tag required, since the frozen copy is a real
   path under main. Downgrades the "tag is REQUIRED" message from
   last commit back to "optionally tag the commit".

3. The frozen corpus's spec_ref fields get rewritten too: from
   `src/04-payload-ack.md` to `versions/<v>/04-payload-ack.md`,
   so a reader following a test vector lands on the spec text the
   vector was paired with at release time.

versions/v0.1.0/ regenerated from scratch via `just cut-version v0.1.0`
to pick up the corpus snapshot + the new sed patterns. The release
is now self-consistent: v0.1.0 spec links go to v0.1.0 corpus, which
links back to v0.1.0 spec.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-12 10:38:02 -06:00

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MeshCore Protocol Specification

Section 8: Payload — Group (GRP_TXT / GRP_DATA)

Overview

Group payloads enable encrypted communication within a channel. All members of a channel share a symmetric secret. The payload begins with a 1-byte channel hash (derived from the channel's shared key), followed by an encrypt-then-MAC blob.

Payload Types

Value Name Description
0x05 GRP_TXT Group text message
0x06 GRP_DATA Group datagram (binary data)

Wire Format

 0
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|channel_hash(1)|    Cipher MAC (2 bytes)       |               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+               |
|              Ciphertext (N × 16 bytes, N ≥ 1)                |
|                                                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Fields

Field Offset Size Type Description
channel_hash 0 1 byte raw First byte of SHA-256(channel_shared_key)
cipher_mac 1 2 bytes raw Truncated HMAC-SHA256 over ciphertext
ciphertext 3 variable (multiple of 16) raw AES-128-ECB encrypted data

Minimum Size

  • Minimum payload: 1 + 2 + 16 = 19 bytes

Channel Hash Derivation

The channel_hash is the first byte of the SHA-256 hash of the channel's 32-byte shared key (PUB_KEY_SIZE bytes):

channel_hash = SHA256(channel_shared_key)[0]

This means hash collisions are expected (1 in 256 chance). When a receiver finds a matching channel_hash, it attempts decryption with each matching channel's secret. Only a successful MAC verification confirms the correct channel.

Encryption

  1. Encrypt plaintext using AES-128-ECB with first 16 bytes of the channel's shared key (GroupChannel.secret).
  2. Compute HMAC-SHA256 over ciphertext using all 32 bytes of the channel's shared key. Truncate to 2 bytes.
  3. Assemble: channel_hash || MAC || ciphertext.

Decryption

  1. Read channel_hash (1 byte).
  2. Search local channel database for channels with matching hash. Multiple channels may match (up to 4 in reference implementation).
  3. For each matching channel, attempt MAC verification and decryption using the channel's shared key.
  4. The first channel that produces a valid MAC yields the correct decryption.

Cross-References

Reference Implementation

  • Mesh::createGroupDatagram() in src/Mesh.cpp — Encoding
  • Mesh::onRecvPacket(), cases PAYLOAD_TYPE_GRP_TXT/GRP_DATA — Decoding
  • Mesh::searchChannelsByHash() — Channel lookup