The last of the paused branches, from its "not for merge" checkpoint:
extraction in ledger-import (text, pages, page images; capped, caught),
journaled as attachment.text_extracted; dedup by hash with
books.find_attachment and books.consolidate_duplicates; annotations and
books.set_entry_settles; the company record categories; the two fuzz
targets; feature attachment_text. Nineteen files conflicted with the
four P4b merges, resolved as plan 8.0.2 says: P6 retakes schema 18 (it
had taken 16, which S4.3 holds; S5 holds 17); the tool table is 129 and
the destructive count 31; both sides' appends kept with their seams
restored; one B-27 paragraph naming every feature; in the old-books
fixture P6's hand-written reimbursement is entry 7 (its ids collided
with S4.3's invoice); the replay fuzzer's list gains S7's
invoice.written_off; S4.3's issued-PDF test expects the extraction
record P6 journals right after a filing.
One integration defect between S7 and P6, found by the arap property
test and fixed here: under P6's dedup, a write-off whose evidence bytes
were filed already (the same collection letter for a second write-off of
the same invoice) was refused only after its entry had been journaled,
at the final link to the invoice ("already linked"). The write-off now
resolves the dedup before anything is journaled and keeps a link the
record already has to the invoice instead of refusing it; an explicit
existing_attachment_id already on an entry is still refused (S7's
one-receipt-once rule). P6's gate never ran before the pause; it runs on
main after this merge, and its ledger-store -> ledger-import dependency
is the open review point (plan 8.0.1).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HS8WZziDnyxunC23MUxrLp
Review finding: `--http` parsed whatever address it was given and bound
it. The door is the plaintext MCP service with a static bearer token;
plan 3.9 and the P9a model put a TLS proxy or tunnel in front of a
loopback listener, and no decision authorises exposing the books
unencrypted. `--http 0.0.0.0:7411` would have done exactly that.
`local::tunnel_address` now accepts only a loopback address
(127.0.0.0/8 or ::1; `127.0.0.1:7411` stays the default) and refuses
anything else with a message naming loopback and why. `server` refuses
while parsing, before it takes the lock or binds a socket; `serve`
refuses before it starts a host, so nothing is left half-open. The
bind-failure behaviour for a loopback address is unchanged (said, not
fatal, 3.9), as is the unit's hardening.
The test `the_tunnel_door_binds_loopback_only` refuses 0.0.0.0, a public
sample address and [::] through `server`, checks no socket or host was
left behind, refuses through `serve`, then starts a loopback listener and
reaches `books.start` with the bearer.
No accounting code, report or figure changes.
The books can live on a machine of the owner's own (plan 3.8, 8.2 P9a,
D-51). Three things make that honest instead of nominal:
- `--isolation same_user|enforced` sets `server::Isolation`, carried
through `Served` and `BooksServer` to `books.start`. Locally the books
stay `same_user (advisory)`; under the self-host unit the server is told
`enforced` and reports `service_user (enforced)`. The server never
guesses, and the literal it used to report is gone.
- `--http [ADDR]` binds the same MCP router on loopback (default
127.0.0.1:7411) beside the Unix sockets, before the ready line, for the
TLS proxy or tunnel in front of the server. It is the same bearer door
and the same graceful close; a failed bind is reported and is not fatal
(3.9). `serve` carries both flags through the host, so the system unit
can ask for them once.
`deploy/wanderbooks-server.service` is the unit: a dedicated account, a
0700 data root, `ProtectSystem=strict`, no seccomp or Landlock (D-32), and
loopback-only networking. `deploy/README.md` is the recipe: install, setup,
move the books by `books adopt` with its head check (D-31: a copied book
is the transport), mint a bearer token, put Caddy or Tailscale Funnel in
front of the loopback door, and point Claude Code and Codex at it.
The two-account CI job (`.github/workflows/two-user.yml`) makes the
deployment and runs `crates/ledger-cli/tests/two_user.rs` as another
account: `agent_uid_cannot_read_tenant` proves the tenant root and its
journal are refused, then reads, writes, uploads, files, exports and
verifies over HTTP with the bearer (in a second book, so the moved books'
head is not advanced); `self_host_adopt_same_head` compares the moved
books' head and event count with the source clone's.
`isolation_label_is_enforced_under_the_unit` runs everywhere, including
the unit-file read that keeps the recipe from drifting.
Accounting reason for the shape: nothing here changes an entry, a report
or a figure. It changes who can reach them: the move is lossless and
verifiable at the head, and the boundary is the operating system's, not a
promise in our text. No journal code, kernel function, Kani harness or
Lean step is touched, so `just prove` is not required.
No go-ahead needed: no new journal feature or event; the live books are
unaffected.
The owner (2026-10-23, via the question tool): "Uploads only"; and
before it: "What we would DEFINITELY want to avoid is passing a bunch
of BLOBs through AI context windows. That's just a pure waste." No file
passes through an agent's context, in either direction.
In: the inline arguments are gone with the 256 KiB limit (INLINE_MAX,
take_file's inline branch): content_base64 and its sha256 on
books.attach_receipt and books.file_document, w9_content_base64 and
w9_sha256 on books.set_w9, csv_text on the two CSV imports. A file comes
only by books.begin_upload and `wanderbooks upload`, named by its
upload_id; existing_attachment_id still names bytes stored already. The
five filing tools deny unknown fields, and any inline argument to any
tool is refused before it runs as an unknown argument pointing to
books.begin_upload (access log: refused inline_file).
Out: books.export (every format), books.asset_labels and
books.get_receipt view bytes hand the file over (HandedFile: download
command and expiry, D-29), as the CPA package and the W-9 do. Resource
reads stay text. A token keeps up to 64 handed files (was 16). The
access log's digest no longer exempts file bytes.
Docs: handbook files-in-out and parties-and-tins, mcp-interface.md,
rules.md, receipt-store.md, parties-and-attachments.md, plan/served.md
(D-46; the inline decisions marked superseded), STATUS.md, testing.md
(D-46: tests migrated to uploads and downloads, rewritten, removed,
added).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3gXMVt7XJPi6ens1or9Dj
The owner (2026-10-23): "We should probably just delete the stdio path
altogether. THere's no point in that. And it sitting there unused will
just lead to bitrot. Nuke it?"
Books are served only by the books server (`wanderbooks server`),
reached by agents through the bridge (`wanderbooks mcp --book ID`),
which stays.
Removed: `wanderbooks dev-stdio`, the `ledger-mcp` binary, and
`ledger_mcp::run` (stdio and `--http` over a bare data dir), with all
that only that mode had:
- files the books make coming back inline: `HandedFile.content_base64`
is gone, and `download` and `expires_at` are always there;
- books with no access log or backups: `books.access_log`,
`books.backup` and `books.back_up_now` are always offered, by scope;
- the settings file read and reloaded (`legacy_files`), the vault key
named by a file or `--vault-key-file`, and the books dir's
key-inside-the-books and git checks (with `paths.rs`);
- `wire.rs` (the bridge frames an agent's lines itself);
- `books.settings`' file fields and `books.start`'s `settings_source`.
`BooksServer` is built one way, from `Served` (a book as the books
server serves it), in production and in the unit tests. An unknown tool
is now a protocol error (mcp-tools.md). Inline file input is unchanged.
Then the owner's three decisions (2026-10-23, the question tool):
(a) `books.import_settings` is removed entirely (118 tools): old books
come in whole by `wanderbooks books adopt`, which reads their settings
file once; ledger-config keeps its settings-file parsing only as far as
adoption uses it (`load` and the path-reading `effective_receipt_policy`
are gone), and `books.chart_template` gives its settings as
`books.set_setting` changes. (b) The viewer's loose-books-folder mode is
removed (`--data-dir`, `--books-toml`, `--vault-key-file`, the settings
file and config.json followed): it opens only books of the data root,
reading settings from the journal and the vault from the book's own
`vault/` and `keys/`. (c) `wanderbooks dev-stdio` has no stub: it is an
unknown command like any other word. Also: an upload's expiry past the
calendar is an error, never an empty string.
Tests: every suite that drove the stdio server moved to
crates/ledger-cli/tests/ and drives a real `wanderbooks server` on a
data root of its own (tests/common), handed files by their download;
mcp_stdio.rs is mcp_journeys.rs. Tests of what is gone are deleted and
listed in docs/testing.md. Docs: plan D-44 (D-18 superseded), STATUS,
testing, rules, mcp-interface, the handbook, README; justfile recipes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3gXMVt7XJPi6ens1or9Dj
On the live books a reconnected bridge got no token from a keyring that
couldn't be read, was told to "make a token", and after
`token create --replace` kept on with the new token in memory while
`download` read a revoked one from the keyring.
- tokens.rs INVARIANT 4: keeping a token removes every item for its
account in every collection, makes one and reads it back; reading finds
every item and, finding several, refuses with how to keep one again; a
locked or unreachable keyring is KeyringError::Unavailable, never
"no token". The logic is shared by the OS keyring and the test files
(now a folder per collection a test can lock, make unreachable, or
plant a second item in).
- make_token reads the token back before saying anything, or revokes it.
- The bridge tells the agent the keyring is locked or unreachable and the
token is fine (or that it holds several items), never to make a token;
it reads the keyring again before every new session, even with a token
held.
- `wanderbooks token check --book ID [--name N]`: whether the token kept
here is the books' live one, asked by its SHA-256 (admin op
token_check), never its text.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3gXMVt7XJPi6ens1or9Dj
Books an update could write a newer format for open on their old format
and are asked at every open; anything needing a new feature is refused
until the owner agrees with the passphrase, after a verified backup that
includes the keys. New books start on the current format. Each projection
schema has its own database file, so an older version still opens the
books until the owner agrees.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3gXMVt7XJPi6ens1or9Dj
`wanderbooks books put-aside ID DATA-DIR [--vault DIR --vault-key FILE]
[PATH...]` moves the old copies of adopted books (their data folder, their
TIN vault and its key, their settings file, the git history around them,
old exports) whole into numbered folders of their own in the root's
legacy/, a list of where each came from written and synced first. Nothing
is deleted. Refused unless the books hold everything the old copy does,
byte for byte (journal, stored files, vault records, key; what adoption
left behind and records the books sealed anew are listed and go aside
too); while a wanderbooks process holds it open for writing; when its
head moved since the preview; for links, paths named twice, inside the
root or missing, a vault or key given as a plain path, and paths on
another disk. Renames never replace anything, and a move cut short puts
back what it moved. Three review rounds of data safety.
The plan records the cutover's answers (Q-3: move the old copies aside;
the backup repository and folder).
Also: `connect`'s "the books fernhill' agent token" reads properly, and
the restart tests wait for a copied program to be runnable (a child forked
by another test while the copy was written made it "text file busy").
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3gXMVt7XJPi6ens1or9Dj
No Landlock, no seccomp, no helper: isolation is "same_user
(advisory)". The lease socket keeps two intents (close, format-upgrade
consent). The viewer holds the books open while it runs and gains a
Books menu: New books, Back up now, Restore (preview, then confirm),
Close, Connect Claude Code / Codex. New commands `wanderbooks books
back-up` and `wanderbooks connect claude|codex`. The scaffold
(`new`/`init` and its templates) is gone; install.sh needs no sudo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3gXMVt7XJPi6ens1or9Dj
The server backs each book up itself: a per-book git archive, pushed
fast-forward only to a git remote and to a folder, when the books open,
after a quiet spell, before they close and on request; every commit,
push and drill is a record in ops/backup.jsonl. Drills clone each
target and verify the chain, the blobs, the vault and the head, weekly
and after a failure. `wanderbooks books restore` previews, then
restores beside or (with --replace) over, never moving books something
holds. The archive refuses anything but a plain bare repository and
pins git against the owner's configuration. books.backup and
books.back_up_now for the agent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3gXMVt7XJPi6ens1or9Dj
`wanderbooks gui [BOOK]` finds the data root, reads settings from the
journal, the vault of the book, presence through ops/, Save a copy /
Open on every document, Save the W-9, the Export menu, and colour
schemes. One builder for the CPA package and the 1099 worksheet
(ledger-package), shared by the server and the viewer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3gXMVt7XJPi6ens1or9Dj
Files reach the books through the server: uploads by hash and size,
then filed; exports (the CPA package, the 1099 worksheet, W-9s) handed
over as downloads from the server, never read off disk by the agent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3gXMVt7XJPi6ens1or9Dj
Agent tokens (wb_ and 64 hex digits), one book and one name each, kept
only as SHA-256 in a chain log and in the OS keyring; made, listed and
revoked only through the admin socket (`wanderbooks token ...`). The
door checks them, scopes cover every tool, every call is in the access
log (fail closed), and the owner passphrase is an Argon2id hash.
Setup's terminal test waits for its prompts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3gXMVt7XJPi6ens1or9Dj
One wanderbooks executable. The books are open while the viewer, an
agent session or a terminal holds them: a host process takes leases on
a socket, starts the server (the hidden mode `wanderbooks server`) with
a pipe on its input, and closes it 10 s after the last lease ends. No
background service. One host even in a race (run/host.lock).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3gXMVt7XJPi6ens1or9Dj
swaitsandClaude Fable 5.1